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INTRODUCTION
As the need for fundamental reform of our nation's labor laws has grown
more and more evident since the 1970s, major reform efforts have focused nar-
rowly on adjusting the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
but have repeatedly foundered amidst intense polarization over tipping the ex-
isting "balance" between labor and management.' At the same time, at the fed-
eral, state, and, increasingly, municipal levels, U.S. labor laws governing worker
organization and collective bargaining have been surrounded by a growing
thicket of other laws governing the workplace. These employment laws have es-
tablished various minimum standards, for example, to be free from specified
forms of discrimination and to have access to family and medical leave. But the
employment law on the books has not been matched by the law in action. Ra-
ther, violations are endemic, particularly at the bottom of the wage scale. A po-
litically feasible (in the medium term), economically rational, and effective re-
form proposal would seek to unify our labor and employment laws.
Such a proposal could not be adopted today and will not be adopted during
the next few presidential administrations.' The complications created simply by
the number of governmental units currently regulating the workplace are
enormous. Nonetheless, it is worth considering how widening our vision of re-
form might not only break the political deadlock over labor law reform, but al-
so address fundamental flaws in both U.S. labor and employment law.
This Article sketches such a vision of reform in four parts. Part I briefly de-
scribes the bifurcated law of the workplace, which is split between the older la-
bor law and the more recently enacted employment law. The former regulates
organizing and collective bargaining, and the latter establishes minimum terms
and conditions of employment by statute. Part I emphasizes both the different
regulatory philosophies underlying the two regimes and also the gradual, his-
torical accretion of workplace regulation, which has resulted in a voluminous
and largely uncoordinated set of laws. Part II identifies the central failures of
each regulatory regime-labor law's stubborn resistance to reform, increasing
numbers of workers without representation, and the underenforcement of em-
ployment law, particularly for the most vulnerable workers. Part III describes
the promise of unification of the two regimes. Collective bargaining could both
reduce enforcement costs and allow flexibility in the application of minimum
standards laws, possibly reducing employers' implacable opposition to labor
law reform and permitting expanded union representation. The resulting ex-
panded union representation could, in turn, ensure enforcement of employ-
ment law. Finally, Part IV discusses two current legal controversies: the first,
over agreements to arbitrate employment law claims that include a waiver of
1. Of course, the absence of reform has itself dramatically tipped the "balance" to-
ward management as explained below.
2. During that time, adoption of the Workplace Action for a Growing Economy
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unrepresented employees' right to engage in collective enforcement activity,
and the second, over state and local minimum standards laws that permit waiv-
er or modification of their terms via collective bargaining. Part IV uses these
controversies as lenses through which to view how a more integrated regime of
workplace regulation might function.
I. THE BIFURCATED LAW OF THE WORKPLACE
When the NLRA was signed into law in 1935, it was the central and almost
the only federal regulation of the workplace.3 It would be three years before
Congress established a minimum wage in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)4
and just shy of three decades before it prohibited employment discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
The regulatory philosophy embodied in the NLRA, in contrast to today's
employment laws, was tersely expressed by the Supreme Court in 1943:
[T]he National Labor Relations Act ... does not undertake govern-
mental regulation of wages, hours, or working conditions. Instead it
seeks to provide a means by which agreement may be reached with re-
spect to them. The national interest expressed by those Acts is not pri-
marily in the working conditions as such. So far as the Act itself is con-
cerned these conditions may be as bad as the employees will tolerate or
be made as good as they can bargain for. The Act does not fix and does
not authorize anyone to fix generally applicable standards for working
conditions.6
However, three years after adopting the NLRA, Congress decided that some
conditions were too bad to tolerate. The 1938 FLSA declares that "labor condi-
tions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living neces-
sary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers" should be correct-
ed and eliminated "as rapidly as possible" through the adoption of national
minimum wage and maximum hours standards and the prohibition of child
labor.' Since the New Deal, Congress has continued to embrace both of these
3. The Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2012), and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2012), preceded the NLRA and served as its
foundation, but the RLA was limited to a single industry and Norris-LaGuardia re-
stricted the jurisdiction of the federal courts, rather than directly regulating labor
relations, because of limitations on federal power under the Commerce Clause
imposed by the then-prevailing Supreme Court construction of the Clause.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012).
6. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943). The
case actually concerned the RLA, but the Court spoke to the regulatory philosophy
underlying both laws.
7. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)-(b).
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regulatory philosophies with the legislated establishment of minimum em-
ployment standards accelerating after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'
As the U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
(Dunlop Commission)9 observed in 1994:
The National Labor Relations Act (and the earlier Railway Labor Act)
were the pioneering forms of federal legal regulation of labor manage-
ment relations at the workplace. By the 1990s, though, a very different
model of legal intervention, employment law, has come to play a much
more prominent role both on the job and in the courts. 10
These two distinct forms of workplace regulation are arguably in tension.
Indeed, as the amount of minimum standards legislation expanded, employers
argued that state employment laws were preempted by federal labor law as ap-
plied to represented employees. The employers' argument was based on the no-
tion that the employment laws-by mandating terms or conditions of employ-
ment-interfered with the free collective bargaining encouraged by the NLRA.
As the Supreme Court explained in 1985, employers argued that, "because Con-
gress intended to leave the choice of terms in collective-bargaining agreements
to the free play of economic forces, not subject either to state law or to the con-
trol of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), mandated-benefit laws
should be pre-empted by the NLRA." The Court rejected this argument, how-
ever, finding "[n]o incompatibility exists. .. between federal rules designed to
restore the equality of bargaining power, and state or federal legislation that
imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated be-
tween parties to labor agreements.""
But merely identifying this dichotomy between U.S. labor and employment
law does not adequately describe our workplace policy's profuse, heterogene-
ous, and uncoordinated nature. Consider, for example, only those policies the
8. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF LABOR &
COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT 24 (1994) [hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT],
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1279&context=k
ey-workplace [http://perma.cc/3VJC-FTGH] (citing the Occupation Safety and
Health Act of 1970, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, as illustrations).
9. The Commission was appointed by the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce in an
effort to identify reforms of both labor and employment laws that could obtain
support from both labor and management as well as both political parties. It was
chaired by former Secretary of Labor and then-Harvard Professor John Dunlop.
The Commission conducted a lengthy investigation and produced several valuable
reports, but failed to identify reforms that have been adopted.
10. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 8, at 1o5.
n1. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 748 (1985).
12. Id. at 754.
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enforcement of which is either wholly or partly lodged in the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL). The DOL administers approximately 18o separate statutes.
Those statutes involve twenty distinct enforcement procedures with a consider-
able number of minor variations,1 3 and that does not take into account federal
laws that lie outside the DOL's jurisdiction or state laws. State regulation, of
course, preceded the New Deal. As early as 1916, the pioneering labor relations
scholar John R. Commons, together with John B. Andrews, Secretary of the
American Association for Labor Legislation, wrote:
At the beginning of 1914 the federal Department of Labor assembled
and published the labor laws of the United States in two bulky volumes
totaling more than twenty-four hundred pages. The legislatures of the
following two years added to this list no fewer than five hundred new
labor laws. The laws, moreover, are growing in complexity as well as in
length and number, and to the maze of statutes is added a lengthening
list of administrative orders and of judicial decisions. 14
In short, we have a large and growing number of separate laws governing work.
Workplace policies are not simply voluminous, but are also largely uncoor-
dinated. Current U.S. policy governing work was, of course, not created as a
whole, but rather in fits and starts. As the Dunlop Commission reported: "Con-
gress and its committees have considered the legislation piecemeal."" Along the
way, there has been little systematic review or effort to compare and harmonize
standards, procedures, or remedies under the various statutes even within a sin-
gle level of government. Again, the Dunlop Commission reported:
There has seldom, if ever, been a systematic overview of this statutory
structure and the resulting detailed regulations and court interpreta-
tions that flow from employment law .. .Administrative agencies gen-
erally consider regulatory, interpretive and procedural issues separate-
ly, even in the case of similar issues that arise in different agencies of
the same Department. Courts review individual cases."
13. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF LABOR &
COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT 74 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=O04&context=key
workplace [http://perma.cc/J5Z6-6ZPL]. The Commission's Fact Finding Report
contained an exhibit describing the major statutes and executive orders
"[c]omprising the [fjramework of [flederal [w]orkplace [r]egulation." FACT
FINDING REPORT, supra note 8, at 129-31.
14. JOHN R. COMMON & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION i (ist ed.
1916).
15. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 71.
16. Id.; see also Craig Becker, The Continuity of Collective Action and the Isolation of
Collective Bargaining: Enforcing Federal Labor Law in the Obama Administration, 33
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 414-16 (2012) (describing the isolation of the Na-
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The result is that enforcement of some policies is lodged in the DOL and
enforcement of others-notably, administration of the NLRA-in independent
agencies. Some policies are enforced largely by working people via litigation and
others, including the NLRA (with a few exceptions)," are enforced exclusively
by government. Some policies are established at both the federal and state level,
whereas others, like the NLRA, are established only at the federal level. " One
specific example of the failure to coordinate workplace policies can be found in
the available remedies. Remedies, the Dunlop Commission found, have been
"established at different times" and "have not been reviewed to determine
whether they are equitable for comparable violations of different laws."'9 Con-
sequently, some policies are enforced through the award of full compensatory
and punitive damages and others only via the award of back pay and reinstate-
ment.2 0 In 1994, the General Accounting Office charitably reported: "Like many
industrialized nations, the United States employs several different strategies for
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in administering, enforcing, and construing
the NLRA).
17. Importantly, the only private rights of action (permitting private parties to sue to
enforce their rights) that exist under the Act are possessed by employers seeking to
enforce the amended Act's prohibition of certain forms of secondary pressure by
unions and employees alleging a union breached its duty of fair representation.
18. Congress created one critical exception to federal preemption in 1947 for so-called
"right-to-work" laws, which are state laws providing that unions and employers
cannot agree that all employees must, as a condition of employment, bear their
fair share of the cost of representation. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012). According to
the Supreme Court, these laws generate a "conflict between state and federal law;
but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress." Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Mo-
bil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 417 (1976) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 83.
20. The Dunlop Commission described the diversity of procedures and remedies un-
der U.S. labor and employment laws as follows:
Some cases the individual employee alone can bring (e.g., wrongful dis-
missal suits); others only the administrative agency can file (e.g., FLSA).
Some cases go directly to court (wrongful dismissal); some remain within
the agency (OSHA); some go to the agency for investigation and then to
the courts for adjudication (ADA), while some conduct adjudication
within the agency but leave enforcement (and review) up to the courts
(NLRA). Some legal rights carry open-ended compensatory and punitive
damages (wrongful dismissal); some provide for general damages under a
ceiling, but attorney fees are also assessed against losing employers (Title
VII; ADA); while ... the NLRA is unique in restricting the damages as-
sessed against guilty employers to the net back pay lost by the employ-
ee-along with the prospect of reinstating the employee if the latter is
willing to return to the position from which he or she was fired.
FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 8, at in.
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protecting employees in the workplace."" Less charitably Professor Clyde
Summers described U.S. employment laws as a "jumble of procedures and rem-
edies."2 2
Because our labor and employment laws are voluminous and uncoordinat-
ed, their interrelationship is a source of considerable uncertainty, conflict, and
litigation. When does federal law preempt state regulation?2 3 When does state
law preclude local action? 4 When is union assistance with enforcement of em-
ployment law a "grant of benefits" that requires overturning the results of a un-
ion representation election?2 5 How should apparent conflict between statutes be
reconciled?" In the United States, there is no single expert agency or specialized
court to resolve these conflicts. Even when the conflict is between the NLRA
and another federal statute, while courts defer to the NLRB's construction of
the NLRA, the agency is accorded no deference when it construes other statutes,
even closely-related precursors like the Norris-LaGuardia Act.27
21. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-138, 1 WORKPLACE
REGULATION: INFORMATION ON SELECTED EMPLOYER AND UNION EXPERIENCES 14
(1994), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154468.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YM9-BYK8].
22. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 531 (1992); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND,
REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 75
(2010) (noting "the vast, hydra-headed body of employment law").
23. The primary guideposts in this area are San Diego Building Trades Council, Local
2o2o v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). But these cases
have not drawn clear lines between what is preempted and what is permitted.
24. This has been an issue recently in litigation challenging municipal minimum wage
ordinances. See, e.g., Ky. Rest. Ass'n, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't,
No. 201 5-SC-000371-TG, 2016 WL 6125883 (Ky. Oct. 20, 2016) (striking down Lou-
isville minimum wage ordinance); Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, No.
SC954o1 (Mo. 2016) (challenging St. Louis' authority); City of Kansas City v. Kan.
City Bd. of Election Comm'rs, No. SC95368 (Mo. 2016) (challenging St. Louis' au-
thority).
25. See, e.g., Stericycle, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 582, 583 (2011) (addressing the conflict be-
tween NLRB and several courts of appeals over this issue).
26. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (address-
ing the conflict between fully remedying violations of the NLRA and enforcing the
Immigration Reform and Control Act).
27. See, e.g., Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 843 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (finding that the NLRB's construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not entitled to deference). This type of diffusion of authority over workplace regu-
lation is not common to all countries. In France, for example, I'Inspection du Trav-
ail (the Labour Inspectorate) is not only responsible for enforcing the entire la-
bour code, but also certain provisions of collective bargaining contracts. See
Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival of
Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT'L LAB. REv. 1, 5 (2008); see also An-
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II. THE FAILURES OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
As labor law has increasingly been surrounded by employment laws, it has
become apparent that each form of regulation is plagued by what appear on the
surface to be unconnected problems-growing obsolescence and thus ineffec-
tiveness in the case of labor law and distorted and underenforcement in the case
of employment law.
A. The Frustration of Labor Law Reform
Enacted in 1935, when General Motors was the nation's largest employer,
U.S. labor law has not kept pace with changes in the economy and employment
relationships. Rather, as Professor Cynthia Estlund pointed out in her aptly ti-
tled 2002 article, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, "a longstanding politi-
cal impasse at the national level has blocked any major congressional revision of
the basic text since at least 1959-"" "[N]o other major American legal regime-
no other body of federal law that governs a whole domain of social life,"
Estlund observes, "has been so insulated from significant change for so long." 9
Again and again, reform efforts have foundered, often frustrated by Senate
filibusters that could not be ended via cloture, or presidential vetoes that could
not be overridden. In other words, a determined minority has repeatedly
blocked reform. As Professor Estlund explains, "for many decades, both orga-
nized labor and especially employers have had enough support in Congress to
block any significant amendment that either group strongly opposes."30 Politi-
cal scientist Dorian Warren similarly observes "that several long-term institu-
drew Schrank & Michael Piore, Norms, Regulations, and Labour Standards in Cen-
tral America, ECON. COMM'N LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN 14 (Feb. 2007), http://
repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/5002/1/So70017oen.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5KPW-8PU2] (contrasting the Anglo-American approach to labor law
enforcement, in which "[e]nforcement agents are divided into different bureau-
cracies with narrow jurisdictions," with the Franco-Iberian approach).
28. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530 (2002). The Act was extended to cover non-profit hospitals in 1974.
29. Id. at 1531.
30. Id. at 1540. Sweeping analyses of this history of frustration are found in Dorian T.
Warren, The Unsurprising Failure of Labor Law Reform and the Turn to Adminis-
trative Action, in REACHING FOR A NEW DEAL: AMBITIOUS GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC
MELTDOWN, AND POLARIZED POLITICS IN OBAMA'S FIRST Two YEARS 191-229 (Theda
Skocpol & Lawrence R. Jacobs eds., 2011) [hereinafter Warren, Unsurprising Fail-
ure], and Dorian T. Warren, The Politics ofLabor Policy Reform, in THE POLITICS OF
MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 103-28 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney
M. Mikis eds., 2014). For a compelling analysis of the role of Southern Democrats
in blocking labor law reform after the NLRA, see Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson,
The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2005).
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tional and political obstacles. . . , including the geographical concentration of
[organized] labor and conservative coalition in Congress, combined with anti-
majoritarian features of the American state, have been and continue to be in-
surmountable" obstacles to labor law reform.3"
In 1965, in the midst of a series of momentous legislative victories and only
a little more than a year after breaking a filibuster to enact the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, President Johnson failed in an effort to refederalize U.S. labor law by
repealing Section 14 (b) of the amended NLRA (which permits states to adopt
so-called "right-to-work" laws). The repeal effort collapsed when the Senate
failed to achieve cloture and end a filibuster.32 In 1976, President Ford vetoed a
bill that would have permitted unions to picket and ask all employees working
at a construction site to strike to protest the conduct of any one employer en-
gaged on the project (so-called "common situs" picketing). The Senate, but not
the House, voted to override the veto.3 In 1978, President Carter's comprehen-
sive Labor Law Reform Act died in the Senate, despite majority support in both
chambers, after a then-record, six failed cloture votes failed to end a filibuster.14
In 1992, the House passed a bill supported by President Clinton that would have
outlawed permanent replacement of strikes, but it fell three votes short of the
number needed to end a filibuster in the Senate.35 The bill met the same fate in
1994.36 In his second term, Clinton vetoed the Teamwork for Employees and
Managers (TEAM) Act that would have loosened restrictions on employer-
31. Warren, The Unsurprising Failure of Labor Law Reform, supra note 30, at 134. Polit-
ical scientist Taylor Dark writes, "For organized labor, perhaps more so than any
other interest group, the American system of balanced bicameralism, combined
with anti-majoritarian rules in the upper house, has proven catastrophic." Taylor
E. Dark III, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Asso-
ciation: Representing Labor in Congress: The Enduring Quest for Labor Law Re-
form 2 (Mar. 20-23, 2008), http://www.taylordark.com/Representing%2oLabor
%2oin%2oCongress.pdf [http://perma.cc/F6QK-XXR2].
32. S. 256, 89 th Cong. (1965).
33. H.R. 5900, 9 4 th Cong. (1975).
34. S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978). A comprehensive study of the reform effort appears in
BARBARA TOWNLEY, LABOR LAW REFORM IN US INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986), and
an account focused on employers' successful effort to block the legislation in
Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers, Labor Law Reform and Its Enemies, 228 NATION 1
(1979); see also Gary M. Fink, Labor Law Revision and the End of the Postwar Labor
Accord, in ORGANIZED LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 1894-1994: THE LABOR
LIBERAL ALLIANCE 239-57 (Keven Boyle ed., 1998). For a more idiosyncratic view,
see ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN-SENATOR 19-42 (2002)
(describing his leadership of a successful filibuster).
35. S. 55, 102d Cong. (1992); H.R. 5, 102d Cong. (1991); see also Craig Becker, "Better
than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 371 (1994).
36. Estlund, supra note 28, at 1541.
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sponsored employee representation and participation programs. The Act's sup-
porters in Congress lacked the votes to override the veto. 37 Finally, in the first
two years of the Obama administration, despite Democratic majorities in both
chambers, the Employee Free Choice Act, another effort at comprehensive la-
bor law reform that had twice passed the House during the prior administra-
tion, also died in the Senate in the face of a threatened filibuster.3' Given the
preceding half-century of experience, Professor Warren labeled this most recent
stalemate an "unsurprising failure." 9
Without necessary changes in the law, the percentage of workers represent-
ed by unions has fallen from a high of 32.7% in 1953 to 12.3% in 2015.40 Likewise,
invocation of the statutory procedure to obtain representation via a petition for
an election has fallen dramatically. 41 The law's promise to U.S. workers that
they have a right to "representatives of their own choosing" 42 is no longer being
fulfilled.
B. The Failure ofEmployment Law Enforcement
As labor law has aged, the number of statutes intended to establish mini-
mum acceptable conditions of work has multiplied, yet it is almost universally
conceded that those laws fail to protect the most vulnerable workers. 43 As Pro-
fessors Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon bluntly state: "Labor standards en-
forcement is not working.""
37. H.R. 743, lo4th Cong. (1995); see also Estlund, supra note 28, at 1541. See generally
John Logan, The Clinton Administration and Labor Law: Was Comprehensive Re-
form Ever a Realistic Possibility?, 28 J. LAB. RES. 609 (2007).
38. H.R. 1409, n4th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 114th Cong. (2009); see also Warren, supra
note 30, at 208; Steven Mikulan, Labor's Love Lost, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 20u), http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/07/opinion/la-oe-mikulan-labor-20110207 [http://
perma.cc/CB4J-ENLG].
39. Warren, Unsurprising Failure, supra note 30, at 193.
40. LEO TROY, TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP, 1897-1962, at 2 (1965); Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Selected Charac-
teristics, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2
.tol.htm [http://perma.cc/537F-SLXQ].
41. Between fiscal years 1970 and 2015, the number of petitions fell steadily from 12,543
to 2,822. 35 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1970); NLRB, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FY 2015, at 18 (2015).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
43. See, e.g., David Weil, Regulating the Workplace: The Vexing Problem of Implementa-
tion, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS 247-86 (David Lewin et al.
eds., 1996).
44. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers' Organizations, 38 POL. & Soc'y 553, 553 (2olo).
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Government enforcement is seriously constrained by inadequate resources
and private enforcement is chilled by employees' fear of suing their employer.
In 2005, two scholars (one of whom, David Weil, is the current Administrator
of DOL's Wage and Hour Division) found that the annual probability of one of
the seven million establishments covered by the FLSA and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) being inspected was .001%.
Private enforcement cannot fully supplement government enforcement. As
Weil observes, "There is reason to believe that workers will systematically un-
derutilize their rights if decisions are made on an individual basis as a result of
both the structure of benefits and costs related to exercise of rights."** The
NLRB has recognized that "[i]ndividually, and even as a group,... employees
often lack the information, resources, money, and security needed to pursue
such litigation." 47 Indeed, the very year that Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Supreme Court recognized that employees who are "[1laymen
cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with prac-
ticed and carefully counseled adversaries." 4 Additionally, even when employees
have the requisite knowledge, the Supreme Court has recognized that "it needs
no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to
induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions." 49
Despite these unique dangers faced by employees who sue their employer,
employees are nevertheless uniquely barred from access to ordinary class action
procedures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 when they seek to enforce
the FLSA. Instead, employees are each required to step forward individually to
affirmatively join such an action."o The result is that, while the Supreme Court
has declared in ringing tones that "FLSA [and other employment law] rights
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived,"" in fact, waiver is endem-
45. David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain: Complaints, Compliance, and the
Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 59, 62
(2005).
46. Weil, supra note 43, at 252.
47. Stericycle, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 582, 583 (2011).
48. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virgina ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); see also
United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
49. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
so. The limitation stems from 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). See generally Craig Becker &
Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculi-
ar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of
Minimum Labor Standards, 92 U. MINN. L. REV. 1317 (2008). Notably, in light of
the argument made in this Article, the 1947 amendments to the FLSA that intro-
duced Section 216(b) and now prevent Rule 23 class actions to enforce the Act were
largely intended to curb union-aided enforcement. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle
at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 172
(1991).
51. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981).
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ic. As Professor Paul Weiler bluntly stated in his seminal book, Governing the
Workplace: "Unfortunately, the initial promise of legal regulation-that it
would insulate the fundamental and equal rights of workers from disparities in
their resources (which clearly influence the outcomes of the market and of col-
lective bargaining) turns out in great part to be mythical.""
Unsurprisingly, given the reasons for underenforcement of minimum
standards legislation, the underenforcement is not uniform across the labor
force, but instead exists primarily among the most vulnerable workers. The
Dunlop Commission questioned whether litigation "protects all kinds of em-
ployees equally well," noting that most discrimination plaintiffs "come from the
ranks of managers and professionals rather than from lower-level workers.""
Litigation, according to Professors Samuel Estreicher and Zev Eigen, is "an at-
tractive source of leverage for well-paid litigants who can afford competent
counsel," but "[flor the overwhelming number of U.S. workers . . . the U.S.
court system is, for all practical purposes, terra incognita." 4 "The fundamental
problem of the current system," Estreicher and Eigen state, "is that the over-
whelming majority of U.S. workers lack access to a fair, efficient forum for ad-
judicating their disputes with their employers."" "[T] he current system sets dif-
ferent de facto standards of legal compliance for employers of low-wage earners
versus high-wage earners.""6 The result is that many working people at the bot-
tom of the wage scale labor under conditions that are below the minimum
deemed socially acceptable."
Employment law also largely fails, at least directly, to reorder existing rela-
tionships to comport with minimum standards. "A striking fact that emerges
from" judicial statistics, Professors John Donohue and Peter Siegelman report-
52. PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 28 (1990).
53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 49-50.
54. Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment Dis-
putes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW 410, 409 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2013).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 414.
57. See, e.g., Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of
Employment and Labor Laws in America's Cities 2 (2009), http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/o3/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/VTU8-
B4BS] (reporting findings from survey of over 4,000 workers in low-wage indus-
tries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City, including that 26% were paid
below the minimum wage and 76% of those who worked overtime were not paid
at required rates); News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Significant Violations in the
Austin Restaurant Industry Raise Concerns to US Labor Department Officials
(Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd2ol61oo 4 [http://
perma.cc/E3VY-F7HC] (announcing that the DOL found violations in 98% of in-
vestigations of restaurants in Austin, Texas in 2015 and 95% in 2016).
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ed in 1991, "is that plaintiffs in employment discrimination litigation rarely sue
their current employers."'" Relying on that research, the Dunlop Commission
found that most discrimination actions are brought by former employees. 9 In
fact, Donohue and Siegelman found that only one in ten civil rights actions
against private employers is filed by an employee still on the job.6 o This suggests
that the laws are not working to ensure ongoing compliance except via an indi-
rect deterrent effect. These facts led Donohue and Siegelman to conclude that
"to protect workers from on-the-job discrimination, alternatives to the current
form of private litigation must be found."61 The identity of plaintiffs may also
suggest that some litigation results from former employees pouring what may
be legitimate grievances over their termination into a limited number of availa-
ble juridical molds, despite a less than perfect fit between their grievance and
the legal relief available." It most clearly suggests that many current employees
will not risk their jobs, or retaliation short of termination, by suing their em-
ployers in order to ensure that the law on the shop floor comports with the law
on the books, no matter how well-founded their grievances are in the law.
Historically separated, our labor and employment laws have both failed
many American workers.
III. THE PROMISE OF UNIFICATION
Knitting together the bifurcated pieces of our system of workplace regula-
tion might serve as the foundation for solutions to each of the seemingly sepa-
rate problems described in Part II.
The frustration of labor law reform might be addressed by widening the
legislative focus to encompass both labor and employment law. Although em-
ployers may be content to permit labor law to become obsolete through inac-
tion, they are concerned about the high cost of judicial enforcement of em-
ployment standards, particularly through class actions and their rigidity." Ex-
Expanded union representation, facilitated by labor law reform, could address
both of employers' grievances about employment law.
58. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1031 (1991).
59. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 49-50, 56.
6o. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 58, at 1031.
61. Id. at 1032.
62. Donohue and Siegelman posit that one of the reasons why there was substantial
growth in discharge cases compared to hiring cases under Title VII between 1966
and 1985, was the decline in union representation that left an increasing number of
workers unable to challenge their discharge under contractual just-cause provi-
sions. Id. at 1019.
63. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 49.
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Employers contend that the cost of defending claims under various em-
ployment laws in court is excessive and that "[a]rbitration is faster, easier, and
less expensive." 6 4 Expanded union representation could facilitate arbitration of
statutory disputes. Such arbitration is commonplace under collective bargain-
ing agreements, as it is central to fulfilling the purpose of federal labor law. In
1960, in one of its Steelworkers Trilogy, which placed arbitration firmly at the
center of federal labor-relations policy, the Supreme Court stated, "The present
federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the collective bar-
gaining agreement" and "[a] major factor in achieving industrial peace is the
inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining
agreement."" Parties to collective bargaining agreements have almost universal-
ly adopted arbitration as a means of resolving contractual disputes. In 2009, the
Supreme Court held in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,66 that employers and unions
can agree to incorporate legislated minimum standards in collective- bargaining
agreements, and to enforce represented employees' statutory claims through
arbitration rather than litigation.
Of course, to expand the use of collectively-bargained arbitration proce-
dures to enforce statutory rights, unions would have to agree to do so and agree
clearly and unmistakably. 'I Unions are currently, and understandably, reluctant
to do so without new resources given the additional legal expertise needed to
present statutory claims and the factual complexity of many such claims. This is
particularly true in "right-to-work" states, where, under current law, a union
could be obligated to present a complex statutory claim on behalf of a non-
member who could not, in turn, be required to pay even his or her fair share of
64. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner at 27, Rose Group v. NLRB, Nos. 15-4092, 16-1212 (3d Cir. Apr.
26, 2016).
65. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
66. 556 U.S. 247 (2009). An article by counsel for both the union and the employer
association that were party to the collective bargaining agreement at issue in Pyett
describes both the legal questions that have arisen post-Pyett and the two parties'
handling of their disagreement about the application of the decision to their own
agreement. See Terry Meginniss & Paul Salvatore, Response to an Unresolved Issue
from Pyett: The NYC Real Estate Industry Protocol, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 69TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (forthcoming 2016). Three
important legal questions that remain unanswered are: can such an agreement re-
quire that grievances on behalf of each individual employee be pursued separately
in arbitration; can an employee file in court, regardless of such an agreement, if
the union decides not to take his or her case to arbitration in a manner consistent
with its duty of fair representation; and does the same duty of fair representation
apply to the union's enforcement of the agreement when the claim is that an em-
ployee's statutory rights were violated as when the claim is a simple breach of con-
tract?
67. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998).
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the overall cost of union representation." Further, the question of whether the
union has the same duty of fair representation toward a represented employee
when his or her claim is based on a statute as when it is based solely on contract
will have to be answered before large numbers of unions will agree to assume
this responsibility, given that unions' duty runs to the entire unit of represented
employees as a whole.6 9 Thus, unions' ability to agree to arbitral enforcement of
statutory rights under Pyett is not itself a solution to the complex of regulatory
problems, but only one piece of a necessarily larger, possible reform.
Employers also contend that employment laws impose "one-size-fits-all"
standards that do not, in fact, fit some workplaces. As Professor Weiler ob-
serves, U.S. business leaders lament "the often procrustean fit of a single legal
requirement imposed by a remote government agency on the varying needs of
millions of workplaces."7 0 Notably, this rigidity is the direct result of the shift
from promoting bargaining to establishing minimum standards. Weiler contin-
ues, "Because we have shifted the power of decision-making to distant lawmak-
ers in order to overcome the problem of disparity in local bargaining power, we
thereby sacrifice the necessary appreciation of what precautions would actually
be most sensible in a particular setting."" As Professors Estreicher and Eigen
point out, a regulatory system founded on employment laws "lacks the intimate
knowledge of industries' peculiarities, and flexible specialization of the 'law of
the shop"" characteristic of parties to collective bargaining and the arbitrators
who enforce their agreements.
Yet, with appropriate legislative authorization, employers and unions can
adjust legislated labor standards through collective bargaining to fit their par-
68. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F3d 654 (7 th Cir. 2014). This construction of the
NLRA's Section 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 16 4 (b) (2012), is currently being challenged in
two pieces of litigation. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 139 v. Schimel,
No. 16-CV-590-JPS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131458 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2016); Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 370 v. Wasden, No. 4 :15-CV-oo00oo-EJL-CWD,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146966 (D. Idaho Oct. 24, 2016). Appeals are currently pend-
ing from both of these decisions.
69. The Supreme Court explained the tensions inherent in combining such individual
representation with an obligation to the whole in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974), but largely ignored them in Pyett, 556 U.S. at 269-
72.
70. WEILER, supra note 52, at 27.
71. Id. Professor Estlund similarly observes, "Two of the inherent weaknesses of uni-
form minimum standards are their rigidity in the face of changing conditions and
their uniformity in the face of firms' widely varying capabilities and workers' vary-
ing needs and interests." ESTLUND, supra note 22, at 20; see also id. at 76.
72. Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 54, at 413. The "law of the shop" quote is from the
Steelworkers Trilogy, specifically, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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ticular circumstances, accounting for employee desires, geographic and indus-
try variation, and other local factors.73
In its 1994 decision in Livadas v. Brandshaw,74 the Supreme Court held that
a state policy of not enforcing a requirement of timely payment of wages due
upon termination on behalf of represented employees was preempted by the
NLRA. The Court reasoned, "It would turn the policy that animated the Wag-
ner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen
to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers." 5 In so holding, howev-
er, the Court made clear that its decision "cast no shadow" on the validity of
"narrowly drawn opt-out provisions."7' The Court referred to a number of state
and federal laws that provide "union-represented employees . .. the full protec-
tion of the minimum standard, absent any agreement for something different."77
Indeed, in an earlier decision involving a state law requiring severance pay after
a plant closing, but exempting employers that are party to a collective bargain-
ing agreement requiring severance pay (even if the contractual requirement did
not match the statutory mandate), the Court reasoned that opt-out provisions
bolster the case against preemption of minimum standards legislation: "The fact
that the parties are free to devise their own severance pay arrangements ...
strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on collective bargain-
ing."78 In other words, minimum conditions legislation can permit unions to
waive the law's protections on behalf of represented employees and opt for
something different.
73. Professors Michael Piore and Andrew Schrank argue that the discretion vested in
the labor inspectorate in France and Latin America play a similar role. Piore &
Schrank, supra note 27.
74. 512 U.S. 107, 129 (1994).
75. Id. at 129 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
76. Id. at 132.
77. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have understood Livadas to hold
that state employment laws are preempted if they simply exempt employers that
are a party to collective bargaining agreements, but not preempted if they permit
parties to bargain an express opt-out provision, or if they exempt employers who
are parties to collective bargaining agreements containing provisions addressing
the problem the legislature sought to resolve even if the bargained solution differs
from the legislated solution. See, e.g., Firestone v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1o63,
1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a provision exempting employees from the Cali-
fornia overtime law, when the employees are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement that provides "premium wage rates" for overtime work, is not
preempted on the ground that the law exempts only "those [employees] who have
sought and received alternative wage protections through the collective bargaining
process").
78. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 22 (1987).
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As the Supreme Court pointed out in Livadas, many federal and state laws
already allow minimum standards to be altered through collective bargaining,
including the foundational FLSA. Since 1938, the FLSA has provided that "in
pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective bargaining by repre-
sentatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National Labor Relations
Board," a union and an employer can alter the 40 hour a week threshold for
overtime compensation so long as their agreement requires that the 40 hour
standard is met when employees' weekly hours are averaged over a six-month
period, thereby providing for considerably more flexibility in scheduling." Pur-
suant to this authorization, the NLRB has a special procedure for certifying rep-
resentatives as "bona fide" that extends beyond its ordinary jurisdiction to en-
compass representatives of federal, state, and local employees."o A similar
exemption provision exists in the requirement that pension plans have specified
minimum coverage in order to qualify for tax advantages under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act." The Livadas Court also pointed with approv-
al to a considerable number of state minimum standards laws containing such
collectively bargained opt-out provisions."8 Since the Supreme Court's decision
in Livadas, a number of lower federal and state courts have rejected challenges
to such provisions."
79. 29 U.S.C. § 20 7(b)(1) (2012). Additional examples from the FLSA are Sections
207(b)(2), (f) and (o)(2)(A)(i) and 203(0) (the last cited by the Court in Livadas).
8o. See County of Alameda, 322 N.L.R.B. 614 (1996); NLRB, CASE HANDLING MANUAL,
PART Two: REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS (2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/CHM2-Sept2ol4.pdf [http://perma
.cc/Z38M-WPVG].
81. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(3)(A).
82. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 n.26 (1994). The Court cited an addendum to
the Brief of Amicus Employers Group listing examples of opt-out statutes from
eighteen states and the District of Columbia. Brief for the Employers Group et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at Appendix B, Lividas, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)
(No. 92-1920), 1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 149; see also David I. Levine et al.,
'Carve-Outs' from the Workers' Compensation System, 21 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
467 (2002).
83. Litigation concerning opt-out provisions has largely been conducted in the Ninth
Circuit. See Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 834 F.3d 958 (9th
Cir. 2016) (upholding opt-out provision of City Hotel Worker Minimum Wage
Ordinance); Firestone v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1o63, 1o67 (9th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that a California law exempting employees from the state overtime law where
they were covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides "premium
wage rates" for overtime work, was not preempted by the NLRA); Viceroy Gold
Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 486-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a California law
limiting the hours mine employees could work in a day that was amended to ex-
clude employees covered by collective bargaining agreements "where the agree-
ment expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of
the employees"); NBC Inc. v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69, 71-72 (9th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing exemption from state law requiring double pay for hours worked over twelve
177
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Opt-out provisions also exist in Western European labor law. In the Nordic
countries, where the rate of union representation is relatively high, many em-
ployment laws allow their terms to be altered by collective agreement. This kind
of legislation is described as "semi-mandatory." In Sweden, for example, the
Working Time Act, the Annual Holidays Act, and large parts of the Employ-
ment Protections Act are semi-mandatory. These provisions generally allow for
waiver through collective agreements only at the sectoral level, however, and
not at the individual firm level.4 In Germany, collective agreements can "dero-
gate" from the Hours of Work Act in a number of specified respects as well as
from legislation requiring equal pay for and treatment of temporary agency
employees. In addition, the recently enacted general minimum wage can be de-
viated from by collective agreement during a two-year implementation period. 'I
These forms of integration of labor and employment law can yield less ex-
pensive enforcement and flexibility where it benefits both employees and em-
ployers. Consequently, they might convince employers to soften their implaca-
ble resistance to labor law reform aimed at making representation more
accessible to U.S. employees.
in a day for workers "covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
providing specified minimum overtime benefits"); Rawson v. Tosco Refining
Corp., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding law granting em-
ployees double pay for certain overtime hours, while exempting employees cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides a premium overtime rate
and base wages of at least one dollar above the minimum wage); see also St. Thom-
as-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n v. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 235, 245 (3d Cir.
2ood) (upholding an opt-out provision of Virgin Island's unjust discharge law that
limited termination of employees to specified causes "[u] nless modified by union
contract").
84. Jonas Malmberg, The Collective Agreement as an Instrument for Regulation of Wages
and Employment Conditions, 43 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 189, 195-96 (2002). When
derogation is allowed at the firm level it is typically hedged by restrictions, for ex-
ample, allowing it only on a temporary basis. See Semi-Discretionary Law, EUR.
FOUND. FOR IMPROVEMENT LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONs, http://www
.eurofound.europa.edu/emire/sweden/anchor-semidispositivelag-se.htm [http://
perma.cc/WPR4-3J68]. Moreover, caselaw has developed the concept of "undue
undermining," invalidating the collectively-bargained rule when it seriously un-
dermines the statutory standard. Id.
85. Arbeitszeitgesetz [ArbZG] [Hours of Work Act], June 19, 1994, BGBL I at 1170,
§ 7 (Ger.); Arbeitnehmeruiberlassungsgesetz [AOG] [Act Regulating the Commer-
cial Lease of Employees], Feb. 3, 1995, BGBL I at 158, § 9 no. 2, S.2 (Ger.);
Mindestlohngesetz [MiLoG] [Minimum Wage Act], Aug. n1, 2014, BGBL I at 1348,
§ 24 (Ger.). Outside of Western Europe, in Australia, while the parties to collective
bargaining cannot alter the terms of minimum standards legislation, agreements
can supplant standards set by awards at the industry or occupation level. Such
agreements are subject to a "better off overall test" to ensure that workers suffer no
disadvantage. See ANDREW STEWART ET AL., CREIGHTON & STEWART'S LABOUR LAW
392-97 (6th ed. 2016). I thank Professors Jonas Malmberg, Ridiger Krause, and
Andrew Stewart for these insights into comparative opt-out provisions.
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Giving unions a role in the shaping, enforcement, and administration of
legislated minimum standards might also encourage more employees to seek
representation, particularly low-wage and other vulnerable workers who have
never been represented in significant numbers and among whom union density
has declined most dramatically.86 In contrast to some other countries, the Unit-
ed States affords unions no formal role in enforcing or administering legislated
workplace standards and benefits. For example, in the United States, unem-
ployment insurance is mandated by federal and state statute and administered
by state agencies. In contrast, in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Belgium, un-
der the Ghent system, unions administer unemployment insurance plans subsi-
dized by the government.7 Three of the four Ghent-system nations have the
highest union density in the world and the fourth, Belgium, is number six. On
average, Ghent-system countries have union density seventeen percent higher
than non-Ghent countries." Swedish Professor Bo Rothstein concludes, "we
can say that it is possible to have a fairly strong union movement without a
Ghent system, but in order to have really strong unions, such a system seems
necessary."'9 Although the Ghent system may not be suited to the U.S. context,
developing a comparable role for unions in the administration of U.S. employ-
ment laws is surely possible.
Expanded union representation would, in turn, ensure higher rates of en-
forcement of employment laws, particularly by current employees. Empirical
evidence clearly demonstrates that unions significantly increase the enforce-
ment of a broad range of employment laws on behalf of the employees they rep-
resent. Under OSHA, for example, across similar workplaces, unions increase
the likelihood and intensity of inspection and the size of penalties for viola-
tions.9 0 Professor Weil summarizes the literature concerning the union effect
on enforcement of employment laws: "This consistent body of empirical evi-
dence confirms that unions improve the de facto implementation" of those
laws.9' This is the case because unions have each of the characteristics Weil
identifies for a "workplace agent" that can potentially solve the problem of en-
forcement: interests allied with individual workers, a means of efficiently gath-
86. David Card, The Effect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, 54
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 296, 297, 305-06 (2001).
87. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 319, 378 (2012).
88. Id. at 333-35. This is true despite the facts that participation in the union-
administered unemployment insurance plans is not conditioned on membership
in the union (except to some extent in Belgium) and that union membership is
typically wholly voluntary in Sweden and Denmark. Id. at 356, 354-55.
89. Bo Rothstein, Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength, in
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
42 (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992).
90. David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20 (1991).
91. Weil, supra note 43, at 265.
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ering and disseminating information about rights, and a method of protecting
workers against retaliation for exercising their rights.9 2 To that list I would add
an efficient means of enforcement through arbitration as discussed above. In-
deed, as early as 1992, Professor Summers, in his article, Effective Remedies for
Employment Rights, identified a:
need for certain institutional and structural changes which will make
protection of these rights more effective . . . The need is to create devic-
es beyond the class action which will enable employees to act together
to protect their individual legal rights. The most obvious device is a un-
ion. 93
Weil draws the same conclusion suggested here: "future consideration of
labor law reform ... should consider the connection-and growing lack of
connection-between unionization and implementation of labor policies as
currently structured." 94 Paradoxically, although the Dunlop Commission sug-
gested that employment law "has come to play a much more prominent role"
than labor law, "both on the job and in the courts,"9 5 in actual operation, i.e.,
"on the job," the failures of employment law have highlighted the continued
need for employee representation. As Professor Weiler put it, "the representa-
tion gap considerably reduces the potential of external legal regulation for
providing effective protection to the intended employee beneficiaries."96
Integration of the historically bifurcated systems of labor and employment
law-collective bargaining and minimum standards-might solve seemingly
unconnected and intractable defects in each system. But what would such an
integrated system look like and how do we begin to move in that direction?
92. Id. at 253.
93. Summers, supra note 22, at 538; see also ESTLUND, supra note 22, at 144 ("Unions fit
the ... bill particularly well, for they are designed to capture the advantages of
employees' inside position while meeting the challenges posed by both the 'public
goods' nature of workplace conditions and the problem of worker dependency
and fear.").
94. Weil, supra note 43, at 265-66. Other scholars, notably Janice Fine and Jennifer
Gordon have identified the importance of workplace representation to the effec-
tive enforcement of employment laws. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 44. Fine has
developed the idea of "co-enforcement," meaning active cooperation between
government enforcement agencies and worker organizations in enforcement. See
Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-
enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, POL. & SOC'Y (forthcom-
ing). Professor Estlund uses the term "co-regulation." ESTLUND, supra note 22, at
22.
95. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 8, at 1o5.
96. WElLER, supra note 52, at 29. As Professor Estlund states, "The representation gap
that faces American workers thus threatens not only workers' voice within work-
place governance and their ability to bargain above the legal floor established by
law; it threatens the floor itself." ESTLUND, supra note 22, at 239.
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IV. POSSIBLE PRECURSORS OF ENFORCEMENT AND TAILORING OF MINIMUM
STANDARDS THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Consideration of two legal questions currently generating considerable
controversy sheds some light on how the bifurcated legal regimes governing the
workplace might be integrated.
Employers are increasingly seeking to suppress effective, private, judicial
enforcement of employment laws, specifically, any form of class or collective
litigation. In a series of cases, employers have urged the Supreme Court to nar-
row the circumstances under which employees can proceed collectively in the
enforcement of their workplace rights.97 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has
pleaded to the Court that "[i]t is hard to overstate the toll that frivolous class
actions take on U.S. businesses,"9' and the Court has tightened the require-
ments for certifying a class of aggrieved employees.99
In addition, encouraged by the pro-arbitration trend in recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence,oo more and more employers are requiring that employees
agree to arbitrate all disputes and to do so solely as individuals, i.e., to waive
their right to file and participate in class and collective actions or even to join
their claims."o' As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in 2015, "[i]t has become rou-
97. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016); Genesis HealthCare
Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338 (2011).
98. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce et al. of the United States as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 20, Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146).
99. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. 338 (tightening requirements for demonstrating the exist-
ence of common questions in Title VII class action).
loo. The key cases are AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding
that contract of adhesion containing arbitration clause that precluded class actions
was enforceable under the FAA despite state court finding that it was unconscion-
able); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to all employment contracts except those of
"transportation workers"); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991) (holding that employees' agreement to arbitrate statutory claims are en-
forceable).
ioi. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011) (finding that
"[e]mployment arbitration grew dramatically in the wake of... Gilmer" and esti-
mating that "for perhaps a third or more of nonunion employees" arbitration is
the sole means of vindicating workplace rights); Nicole Wredberg, Subverting
Workers' Rights: Class Action Waivers and the Arbitral Threat to the NLRA, 67
HASTINGS L.J. 881, 893 (2016) ("In 20o8, it was estimated that about fifteen percent
to twenty-five percent of employers nationally had adopted mandatory arbitration
procedures."); The 2014 Carlton Fields Jorden Burt Class Action Survey: Best Practic-
es in Reducing Cost and Managing Risk in Class Action Litigation, CARLTON FIELDS
JORDEN BURT 1, 30 (2014), http://classactionsurvey.com/pdf/2o14-class-action-
survey.pdf [http://perma.cc/YUN5-PQQJ] (law firm survey of "326 companies of
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tine, in a large part due to this Court's decisions, for powerful economic enter-
prises to write into their form contracts with consumers and employees no-
class-action arbitration clauses."o2 The result, according to Justice Ginsburg, is
to "insulat[e] already powerful economic entities from liability for unlawful
acts." 13
Importantly, none of the recent Supreme Court decisions that have en-
couraged employers to impose arbitration agreements encompassing employ-
ment law claims and containing collective action waivers have considered fed-
eral labor law. Rather, considering only the federal employment law at issue-
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-the Court in 1991 held in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane that the fact that Congress expressly provided for ju-
dicial enforcement of the law does not prevent employers from imposing on
employees, as a condition of employment, an arbitration agreement encom-
passing statutory claims.o 4 In 2013, outside the employment context entirely, in
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court suggested that the exist-
ence of an arbitration clause in a contract of adhesion containing a class-action
waiver cuts off an "affordable procedural path" to protection of federal statuto-
ry rights (under the antitrust laws) and may prevent "effective vindication" of
the legislative purpose, does not render the agreement unenforceable."o'
Paradoxically, the very labor law that many thought was gradually being
rendered obsolete by the set of employment laws whose effective enforcement is
now imperiled by employers' strategy of atomizing enforcement-the NLRA-
may yet save those employment laws from becoming largely a dead letter. The
NLRB has held that employment "agreements" that include a waiver of employ-
ees' right to proceed collectively in both court and arbitration unlawfully inter-
fere with employees' NLRA right to "engage in ... concerted activities for the
purpose of... mutual aid or protection.""o' The Board's holding received a
mixed reception in the courts of appeals, producing a split in the circuits that
may soon be resolved by the Supreme Court."0 7
all sizes and business types" in 2013 found that seventy-two percent included arbi-
tration clauses in their contracts, up from fifty-five percent in 2012, and that forty
percent of those clauses precluded class actions, double the percentage from 2012).
102. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 478.
104. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20. The agreement at issue in Gilmer actually permitted collective
actions in arbitration. See id. at 32.
105. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309, 2312 (2013).
106. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72 (2014), enforcement denied in relevant part,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012), enforce-
ment denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 1 was a member of the
NLRB when it decided D.R. Horton. The quote is from Section 7 of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
107. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Board in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil, as have
the Second and Eighth Circuits. See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d
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If the Supreme Court upholds the NLRB's conclusion that individual em-
ployees cannot be required or even inducedos to prospectively waive their right
to take collective enforcement action, employers might be able to negotiate
agreements with unions to arbitrate employees' statutory disputes on an indi-
vidual basis, but not with unrepresented, individual employees.o9 That is be-
cause in 2009 the Supreme Court held in Pyett"o that a union representing a
unit of employees can agree to arbitrate their statutory claims as explained
above."' The divergence would not be aberrational as unions can agree to waive
other labor law rights, most notably the right to strike, even though individual
employees cannot be held to such a waiver."' It would also be appropriate be-
cause unions, unlike individual employees who typically sign contracts of adhe-
sion, negotiate the mechanics of arbitration, including whether the arbitrator
can hear class-wide grievances. Furthermore, unions, unlike individual employ-
ees, are repeat players whose confidence arbitrators must retain if they want to
stay in business."I The legal regime that will result if the Supreme Court affirms
290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (8th
Cir. 2013). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have agreed with the Board. See Lewis
v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 843
F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). Petitions for a writ of certiorari are pending in Lewis, Mor-
ris, Murphy Oil, and a successor case to Sutherland, Patterson v. Raymours Furni-
ture Co., No. 15-2820-CV, 2016 WL 4598542 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2016).
108. The NLRB has held that it is unlawful for employers to impose an agreement to
arbitrate all claims in individual proceedings on employees even if the employees
are permitted to opt out of the agreement during a window period. On Assign-
ment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 189 (2015). But see Johnmohammadi v.
Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072 (9 th Cir. 2014) (concluding that opt-out provi-
sion renders the agreement lawful).
109. Unless the individual employees have purely individual claims, i.e., they cannot
assert class or collective claims. See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2287.
110. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
11l. See supra Part III.
112. See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2286 ("It is well settled, however, that a properly
certified or recognized union may waive certain Section 7 rights of the employees
it represents-for example, the right to strike-in exchange for concessions from
the employer. The negotiation of such a waiver stems from an exercise of Section 7
rights: the collective-bargaining process. Thus, for purposes of examining whether
a waiver of Section 7 rights is unlawful, an arbitration clause freely and collectively
bargained between a union and an employer does not stand on the same footing as
an employment policy... imposed on individual employees by the employer as a
condition of employment." (citation and emphasis omitted)); see also Mastro Plas-
tics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956).
113. For a vivid description of how unilaterally-imposed arbitration systems involving
organizations that are repeat players on one side and individuals on the other, see
Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/11/o3/
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the Board1 4 might make more employers recognize the benefits of collective
bargaining and thus might permit more current employees, particularly at the
bottom of the wage scale, to enforce their statutory workplace rights.
The second legal question currently in dispute is under what circumstances
legislatures should authorize unions and employers to waive or alter statutorily-
established minimum conditions through collective bargaining. A specific ex-
ample illustrates how an opt-out provision properly functions in an industry
where non-compliance with minimum standards laws is endemic and unions
have been historically absent: car washing. Car washes are operated by unskilled
workers who, in many areas of the country, are largely undocumented and thus
vulnerable to exploitation. In 20o8, the Los Angeles Times reported that many
car washes in southern California paid less than half the required minimum
wage, and that two-thirds of those inspected by the State's labor department
were out of compliance with one or more employment laws. Although some
violations were minor, others were fundamental: underpaying workers, hiring
minors, operating without workers' compensation insurance and denying
workers meal and rest breaks." 5 Workers faced not only all the typical barriers
to seeking legal relief against their employers, but also often found that when
they did so, they could not collect on judgments because the employers lacked
sufficient assets to pay or could no longer be located.
The California legislature began to respond to this enforcement problem in
2003 by adopting a bond requirement for operating a car wash. The bond pro-
ceeds were made available "for the benefit of any employee damaged by his or
her employer's failure to pay wages, interest on wages, or fringe benefits" or
turn over tips."' In 2014, recognizing that workers are better off receiving the
minimum wage when it is due rather than collecting on a judgment years later,
business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html
[http://perma.cc/L6W2-V4BY]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbi-
tration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/n/oi/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [http://perma.cc/XNL5-F22M]; and Jessica Sil-
ver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a "Privatization of the Justice Sys-
tem," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/11/o2/business/
dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [http://perma
.cc/4DNU-YV3H].
114. Of course, even if the Court does not affirm the Board, Congress could achieve the
same result by amending the Federal Arbitration Act, the NLRA, or the Norris
LaGuardia Act. The latter already prevents federal courts from barring any person,
whether "singly or in concert," from "aiding any person participating or interested
in any labor dispute who is . . . prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of
the United States or of any State." 29 U.S.C. § 104(d) (2012).
115. Sonia Nazario & Doug Smith, Workers Getting Soaked at Southland Carwashes, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2oo8/mar/23/local/me-
carwash23 [http://perma.cc/FV28-7MEH].
n6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2055(b)(i) (2015).
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the legislature amended the car wash law to both increase the required amount
of the bond and provide an exemption for "an employer covered by a valid col-
lective bargaining agreement, if the agreement expressly" sets wages and hours
and provides for an "expeditious process to resolve disputes concerning non-
payment of wages.""' In other words, the legislature gave car wash employers a
choice of means to ensure workers are paid in accordance with law-employers
could post a bond or enter into an agreement providing for extrajudicial en-
forcement of the law of the workplace, typically through arbitration, with a
properly-chosen representative of their employees. The latter type of insurance
is effective because employees have a representative with knowledge of the law,
the right to obtain payroll information, a more continuous presence in the
workplace than government investigators, and the ability to enforce contractual
commitments and legal requirements on a unit-wide basis. Represented em-
ployees can also seek enforcement without fear of retaliation and through a fair,
economical, and relatively speedy system of labor arbitration."
In addition to ensuring that workers are either paid in accordance with law,
or at least can eventually collect on a judgment, the Car Wash Law resulted in
employees gaining some representation in the Los Angeles car wash market.
Although employee representation expanded largely among the smallest and
most economically vulnerable employers, making the foothold tenuous and
improving employees' wages and benefits through bargaining difficult, the in-
creased representation furthered the purpose of the Car Wash Law by securing
workplace-level enforcement among those employers most likely to disappear,
leaving unpaid wage obligations behind.
Yet op-out provisions remain controversial. A New York City ordinance
modeled on the California Car Wash Law has been challenged on federal labor
117. Id. § 2055(b)(4) (2015).
ii8. These provisions of the car wash law can be characterized as what Professors
Estlund and David Levine have labeled "conditional deregulation"-offering
"firms the opportunity to opt out of certain aspects of the default regime for en-
forcement of labor standards and employee rights... if they maintain employee
representation committees, chosen by employees and insulated in certain respects
from managerial control, to oversee the firms' pursuit of regulatory goals."
ESTLUND, supra note 22, at 23 (citing DAVID I. LEVINE, WORKING IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: POLICIES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH TRAINING,
OPPORTUNITY, AND EDUCATION 150-53 (1998)); see also id. at 218-19 (describing the
"ideal sanctions regime" suggested by Professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier
Kraakman, involving a "composite between strict corporate liability for miscon-
duct without regard to precautions taken and a duty-based regime that deals out
sanctions based on precautions taken" under which "self-regulators would escape
the higher 'default sanction,' which must be high enough to induce firms to un-
dertake self-policing and to discover and disclose wrongdoing when it occurs")
(citing Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997)).
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law preemption and other grounds.' 9 In addition, when news broke in the
spring of 2016 that the Los Angeles City Council was considering adding an opt-
out provision to a newly-enacted minimum wage law stepping the minimum
up to $15 per hour by 2020, the Los Angeles Times called it a "minimum wage
loophole."' 2' Another headline pejoratively proclaimed: Outrage After Big Labor
Crafts Law Paying Their Members Less than Non-Union Workers.12 1 The same
year, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce produced a report on collectively-
bargained opt-out provisions entitled, Labor's Minimum Wage Exemption: Un-
ions as the 'Low-Cost' Option.2 "This 'escape clause,"' the Chamber suggested,
"is often designed to encourage unionization by making .a labor union the po-
tential 'low-cost' alternative to new wage mandates, and it raises serious ques-
tions about whom these minimum wage laws are actually intended to bene-
fit."1 23
But the overwhelming empirical evidence on union enforcement of mini-
mum labor standards described above, together with the evidence of a contin-
ued union wage premium, 2 4 suggests that opt-out provisions will not make
represented workers the "low-cost option" even if representation can provide
employers greater flexibility under such provisions. Rather, so long as vigorous
union representation ensures that employees' consent is not coerced, employers
and employees will agree to waive or alter statutory standards in collective bar-
gaining only if doing so makes both better off. For example, an employer and its
employees may both gain via the scheduling flexibility achieved by adopting a
permitted alternative to the FLSA's 40 hour per week overtime standard. Thus,
the Chamber's rhetoric aside, narrowly-drawn and carefully-selected opt-out
provisions can advance both employers' and workers' interests.
119. See Complaint, Ass'n of Car Wash Owners, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-
8157 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015).
120. Peter Jamison, Why Union Leaders Want L.A. To Give Them a Minimum Wage
Loophole, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-
union-exemption-20150726-story.html [http://perma.cc/BE6F-HCA3].
121. Peter Jamison, Outrage After Big Labor Crafts Law Paying Their Members Less than
Non-Union Workers, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/
cityhall/la-me-union-minimum-wage-2016O41O-story.html [http://perma.cc/
DXA2-SLRK].
122. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, LABOR'S MINIMUM WAGE EXEMPTION: UNIONS AS
THE "Low-COST" OPTION, 2016 UPDATE, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default
/files/documents/files/_final-reportlaborsminimum-wage-exemption.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XM6Q-5U6W].
123. Id. at 3.
124. See, e.g., Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages,
ECON. POL'Y INST. (Aug. 29, 2010), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib342-unions-
inequality-faltering-middle-class/ [http://perma.cc/Q2CJ-VUWQ] (noting that the
overall union wage premium is 13.6%).
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However, like bargained arbitral enforcement of employment laws, opt-out
provisions cannot stand alone. Rather, they need to be combined with wide-
spread, robust, independent, and democratic union representation-i.e., with
broader labor law reform.2 5 In addition, rather than loosening the prohibition
on company unions, as Congress attempted to do in mid-199os,"' the prohibi-
tion should be maintained, if not strengthened. The NLRB's current, little-
known role in certifying unions as "bona fide" under the long-standing opt-out
provision in the FLSA's overtime requirement"' could also be made more prob-
ing and expanded to apply in other contexts.
Furthermore, some minimum standards should remain just that. In some
cases, we may believe that no working person should labor under less favorable
conditions, no matter what the corresponding compensation. Other standards
might remain universal because we do not believe they are properly subject to
elimination or adjustment at the will of the majority, at least not at the level of
the bargaining unit. Anti-discrimination laws likely fall in the latter category.
I am not suggesting, therefore, that at the present moment unions should
universally assume responsibility for enforcing represented employees' statutory
rights through collectively bargained systems of arbitration. Nor am I suggest-
ing that legislatures should amend all minimum standards legislation to permit
parties to collectively bargain to alter their terms. My suggestions are more
modest and tentative. I suggest that arbitral enforcement of legislated labor
standards by employees' collectively chosen representative could be both more
effective and more economical than individual employees' judicial enforce-
ment. I also suggest that permitting bargained adjustment of some minimum
standards could make all parties better off. In other words, I suggest that the
present legal controversies might be windows into the type of merger of labor
and employment law that could benefit both employers and employees. Cou-
pled with labor law reform leading to expanded union representation, this mer-
ger has the potential to represent both a politically possible and socially and
economically rational reform.
125. In some Western European countries, the concern that weak or company-
dominated unions will undermine legislated standards through bargained opt-out
provisions is addressed by permitting such alteration of minimum standards only
at the sectoral level. See Dimick, supra note 87. In the United States, however, there
is little sectoral bargaining in part because the NLRA does not permit the NLRB to
require multi-employer bargaining absent employers' consent. See, e.g., Pac. Met-
als Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 696, 699 (1950).
126. See supra Section II.A.
127. See supra Part III.
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CONCLUSION
In 1994, the Dunlop Commission called for "integrated employment regu-
lation.""' The Commission explained, "This country needs to develop institu-
tional arrangements that will do a better job of integrating the host of legally
distinct programs all trying to influence and reshape different parts of the same
employment body.""'9 In the succeeding two decades, no such integration has
occurred. This Article has hardly described a fully integrated system of regula-
tion. It has merely sought to open a discussion of what one might look like and
how it might not only eliminate confusion, conflict, inconsistency, and redun-
dancy, but also begin to address the most serious deficiencies in our current,
bifurcated system of workplace regulation.
In 1985, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that federal labor law
preempted state minimum standards legislation, reasoning, "[n]o incompatibil-
ity exists .. . between federal rules designed to restore the equality of bargaining
power, and state or federal legislation that imposes minimal substantive re-
quirements" on the employment relationship.o3 Since that time, it has become
more and more evident that our labor and employment laws are not only not
incompatible, but depend crucially on one another in order to make real their
respective promises to working people in the United States: "to representatives
of their own choosing" and to "labor conditions" conducive to "the mainte-
nance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being."' 3' Beginning to knit together the two parts of our bifurcated
law of the workplace might put us on a path toward fulfilling both of those
promises.
128. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 8, at 123.
129. Id. at 124.
130. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754 (1985).
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 202(a) (2012).
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